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LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
Kenneth M. Murchison*
From the perspective of local governments, the most important
decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the October 1986 Term
were undoubtedly those concerning land use regulations. Although the
Court reaffirmed the power to impose stringent regulations,' it decided
two other cases adversely to governmental regulators. One held that the
Federal Constitution required payment of just compensation for a "temporary" taking, 2 and the other required that conditions in land use
permits bear a reasonable relation to the burden imposed by the permitted
use.' The discussion below briefly analyzes each of these decisions.
The Court rendered other decisions whose importance to local governments merits notation, even though space limitations preclude discussing them in detail. For example, the Court held that discriminatory
motive can invalidate a city's proposed annexation even though the city
currently contains no black voters, 4 and it reaffirmed that the first
amendment provides near absolute protection for public employees speaking on matters of public concern.5
At the state level, a variety of judicial and legislative developments
occurred, but few were very surprising. The appellate courts rendered the usual array of decisions in a variety of areas including state-local relations, 6 preemption of local ordinances by state law, 7
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Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.

1. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987); see
infra notes 24-41 and accompanying text.
2. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987); see infra notes 42-54 and accompanying text. A more detailed
analysis of First English Evangelical Lutheran Church will appear in a casenote to be
published in a future issue of the Review.
3. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987); see infra notes
55-61 and accompanying text.
4. City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 794 (1987).
5. Rankin v. McPherson, 107 S. Ct. 2891 (1987).
6. See Bush ex rel State v. Williams, 504 So. 2d 1060 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ
denied, 505 So. 2d 1131 (La. 1987) (authority of district attorney to prosecute under state
statute did not supersede authority of city prosecutor to prosecute under city ordinance
proscribing same conduct).
7. See Boh Bros. Construction Co. v..City of New Orleans, 499 So. 2d 385 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1986) (state statute which limited retainage on public contracts to five
percent preempts municipal ordinance providing for 10 percent retainage); Achord v. City
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cooperative arrangements among local governments,' public officers,'
procedural'" and substantive" protections afforded local employees who

of Baton Rouge, 489 So. 2d 1373 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 493 So. 2d 641 (La.
1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 1570 (1987) (statute requiring dispatcher salaries to be 25
percent above those of fire fighters requires that dispatcher salaries be 25 percent higher
than the monthly wages of fire fighters of the same level).
8. See Central Louisiana Bank & Trust Co. v. Avoyelles Parish Police Jury, 493
So. 2d 1249 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986) (parish and special law enforcement district could
legally enter into an agreement for joint funding of construction or improvement of jail).
9. See Holloway v. City of Alexandria, 506 So. 2d 234 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987)
(city attorney had implied authority to appeal adverse judgment unless mayor and city
council manifested some objection); In re Patterson, 496 So. 2d 463 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1986) (clerk of court was an "agency head" precluded from employing a member of his
immediate family in the agency); Richard v. Netterville, 493 So. 2d 241 (La. App. 5th
Cir.), writ denied, 493 So. 2d 1206 (La. 1986) (position of home rule charter commissioner
was an elective office within the meaning'of the state's dual candidacy law); In re Falsetta,
492 So. 2d 113 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986) (mayor violated governmental ethics code by
hiring political acquaintance as an "Intelligence Officer" and paying him an amount
sufficient to cover promissory note on which mayor was a surety); cf. In re Beychok,
495 So. 2d 1278 (La. 1986) (ethics code forbids board member from drawing salary from
company during time that it held supply contract with university).
10. See Washington v. Department of Utilities, 505 So. 2d 93 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1987); Feder v. Pope, 498 So. 2d 270 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986); New Orleans Ass'n of
Firefighters Local 632 v. Civil Service Comm'n, 495 So. 2d 958 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986),
writ denied, 499 So. 2d 84 (La. 1987); Brumfield v. Department of Fire, 488 So. 2d 1181
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1986); see infra notes 91-120 and accompanying text. See also Rocque
v. Department of Health and Human Resources, 505 So. 2d 726 (La. 1987) (rules requiring
notice of appeal to contain clear and concise statement of basis for appeal and precluding
amendment of statement after 30-day prescriptive period imposed unduly onerous responsibility on employee seeking review of disciplinary action); Ellins v. Department of
Health, 505 So. 2d 74 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987) (suspension was reversed because letter
of notification did not specifically state that employee was being suspended for a continuing
pattern of misconduct); Lewis v. Sulphur Municipal Fire & Police Civil Service Bd., 502
So. 2d 1162 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 506 So. 2d 113 (La. 1987) (hearsay information
that fire fighter had been fishing while on sick leave was insufficient to support fire
fighter's dismissal); Chauvin v. Houma Fire & Police Civil Service Bd., 496 So. 2d 441
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1986) (fire fighters who were terminated for smoking marijuana on
duty were not denied due process by city's failure to provide them with copies of urine
and blood test results prior to termination hearing).
11. See Jackson v. Sewerage & Water Bd., 503 So. 2d 634 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987)
(board could consider prior instances of misconduct in deciding whether to discharge
employee for new misconduct); London v. Parkway & Park Comm'n, 503 So. 2d 556
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1987) (in determining if dismissal of employee was appropriate,
commission could consider employee's entire work record); Gerhold v. New Orleans Police
Dept., 503 So. 2d 206 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 505 So. 2d 1141 (La. 1987)
(dismissal of a police officer was proper for conduct which included consumption of
alcoholic beverages on duty and refusal to obey a direct order from a supervisor); Noel
v. Department of Sanitation, 490 So. 2d 498 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986) (appointing authority
failed to prove that laborer's absence due to incarceration for armed robbery charge
impaired the efficient operation of sanitation service and that it bore a real and substantial
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are covered by civil service laws, tenure rights of teachers
and other school employees,' 2 strikes by local employees,' 3
police power regulations," land use planning,' 5 taxation by local

relation to efficient operation of the department); James v. City of Baton Rouge, 489
So. 2d 1308 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986) (city employee was properly suspended and demoted
for seeking to obtain a copy of the city's licensing test for master plumbers); Hayes v.
Department of Police, 489 So. 2d 264 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986) (suspension of officer
for failure to report in prior to leaving place of confinement while on sick leave was
improper because of ambiguity in sick leave rules and regulations).
12. See Meyers v. Sabine Parish School Bd., 499 So. 2d 690 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1986), writ denied, 501 So. 2d 236 (La. 1987) (failure of notification letter to specify
names and witnesses or to state whether such charges had previously been brought against
teacher did not deny tenured teacher due process); Summers v. Vermillion Parish School
Bd., 493 So. 2d 1258 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 497 So. 2d 312 (La. 1986) (school
board could hold removal hearing for school principal charged with possession of marijuana
with intent to distribute before criminal charges arising out of the same incident were
resolved); Jones v. Richland Parish School Bd., 488 So. 2d 1045 (La. App. 2d Cir.),
writ denied, 491 So. 2d 22 (La. 1986) (statutory procedures for discharge of probationary
school bus operators also apply to demotion actions); cf. Dean v. Tensas Parish School
Bd., 505 So. 2d 908 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 508 So. 2d 826 (La. 1987) (letter
notifying untenured school employee of dismissal need not provide reasons for the dismissal); Westrope v. Department of Health & Human Resources, 489 So. 2d 1024 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1986) (award of back wages to reinstated state school employee was properly
offset by unemployment compensation received).
13. See St. John the Baptist Parish Ass'n of Educators v. St. John the Baptist School
Bd., 494 So. 2d 553 (La. App. 5th Cir.), remanded, 497 So. 2d 1387 (La. 1986), modified
after remand, 503 So. 2d 69 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1987) (school board had to comply with
"no-reprisal" condition in agreement signed with teachers to end strike).
14. See City of Shreveport v. Restivo, 491 So. 2d 377 (La. 1986) (city ordinance
prohibiting person licensed by the state as a journeyman plumber from engaging in the
business of plumbing unless he is licensed by the city as a master plumber or works for
a firm with such a license is an unreasonable exercise of the police power); Housing
Auth. v. Moses, 499 So. 2d 1274 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986) (finding that tenant failed to
supervise her children properly was supported by sufficient evidence to justify her eviction
from public housing project).
15. Vezina v. Parish of Jefferson, 506 So. 2d 227 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1987) (parish
council had power to reject resubdivision proposal so long as its decision was not arbitrary
or unreasonable); Park Supply Co. v. St. Tammany Parish, 504 So. 2d 987 (La. App.
1st Cir.), writ denied, 505 So. 2d 1132 (La. 1987) (parish can deny a conditional use
permit on the ground that it will endanger health or safety of adjacent residents or cause
objectionable odor and noise); City of New Orleans v. Elms, 498 So. 2d 773 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1986) (prescription for zoning violation does not begin to run until the city has
notice of the alleged use violation); Kiser v. Parish of Jefferson, 498 So. 2d 115 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 1986), writ denied, 500 So. 2d 423 (La. 1987) (even though zoning ordinance
provided sufficient standards for a special use category, council's denial of permit was
arbitrary and unreasonable in view of its granting of permits in all other similar situations);
Lanaux v. City of New Orleans, 489 So. 329 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986) (owner of property
benefited by variance was an indispensable party to judicial proceeding challenging the
variance's validity); Sanchez v. Board of Zoning Adjustments, 488 So. 2d 1277 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1986), writ denied, 491 So. 2d 24 (La. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 461 (1986)
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special assessments,' 7 public contracts,'" tort liability,' 9

(landowners who purchased property knowing that it did not comply with minimum lot
requirements were not entitled to zoning variance).
16. Concordia Parish School Bd. v. Russ, 491 So. 2d 1368 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ
denied, 496 So. 2d 350 (La. 1986) (taxing authority was not estopped from collecting
sales and use taxes because it had never previously demanded payment of any taxes in
the 30 years that taxpayer had done business in Louisiana); D'Amico v. Rapides Parish
Coliseum Auth., 490 So. 2d 776 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 495 So. 2d 301 (La.
1986) (ticket surcharge imposed to provide funds for increased security, lighting supervision,
and improvements for parking area of coliseum was service charge authorized by police
power of coliseum authority as public body rather than an unauthorized entertainment

tax).
17. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. City of Opelousas, 491 So. 2d 793 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1986) (city's special assessment based on assertion that portion of railroad right of way
should be classified as commercial property for purposes of street improvement financing
was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious).
18. American Waste & Pollution Control Co. v. Madison Parish Police Jury, 488
So. 2d 940 (La. 1986) (statute giving preference to Louisiana contractors on public works
projects did not apply to service contract); St. Charles Parish School Bd. v. GAF Corp.,
500 So. 2d 405 (La. 1987) (prescriptive period on public contract did not begin to run
until the governmental agency knew or should have known of construction defects); JTS
Realty Corp. v. City of Baton Rouge, 499 So. 2d 274 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986), writ
denied, 503 So. 2d 19 (La. 1987) (material alterations between time of public inspection
and time of final approval rendered industrial inducement contract between city-parish
and developer void); Pittman v. Parish of East Baton Rouge, 493 So. 2d 178 (La. App.
1st Cir.), writ denied, 493 So. 2d 1206 (La. 1986) (legislative body awarding contract on
public works contract is acting in an executive rather than legislative capacity, and so
the discretion afforded legislative bodies in performance of purely legislative functions is
not appropriate); Terrebonne Parish Police Jury v. A.L. Sizeler Construction Co., 491
So. 2d 409 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 494 So. 2d 1177 (La. 1986) (contractor who
proves that bid contains a patent error of a mechanical or clerical nature may withdraw
the bid without forfeiting bid bond); Daul Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Parish of Jefferson, 489
So. 2d 364 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 494 So. 2d 323 (La. 1986) (award of insurance
services contract without public bidding did not violate the parish home rule charter
because services provided by the insurance agent under the contract were professional in
nature).
19. Cases interpreting the statute granting landowner's immunity with respect to certain
noncommercial uses of land continued to arise with some frequency. See Ratcliff v. Town
of Mandeville, 502 So. 2d 566 (La. 1987); Stuart v. City of Morgan City, 504 So. 2d
934 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987); Herbert v. City of Kenner, 501 So. 2d 901 (La. App. 5th
Cir. 1987); Holder v. Louisiana Parks Service, Inc., 493 So. 2d 275 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1986); Cooper v. Brownlow, 491 So. 2d 693 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986); Van Pelt v.
Morgan City Power Boat Ass'n, 489 So. 2d 1346 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ granted, 493
So. 2d 627 (La. 1986); see infra notes 121-40 and accompanying text. Other significant
cases involved the standard of care for negligence, e.g., Hamza v. Bourgeois, 493 So.
2d 112 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 497 So. 2d 1013 (La. 1986) (police jury's alleged
failure to provide street lighting in area or to provide sidewalks did not render police
jury liable for death of pedestrian who was struck by a vehicle on the highway), and
the rules governing strict liability. See Wilkinson v. Town of Baker, 506 So. 2d 739 (La.
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and citizen access to public records 0 and the meetings of public bodies. 2'
In addition, the legislature passed bills immunizing local officials and
volunteers from tort liability" and defining the enforcement of local
building codes as a discretionary act that does not give rise to a duty
towyard any particular individual or group.23 The discussion section of
this article focuses on two areas: the procedural protections afforded
to local employees and selected aspects of the legislative and judicial
developments with respect to tort liability.
App. 1st Cir. 1987) (town had no duty to construct or to maintain portion of manhole
structure located in a ditch in such a manner that the structure did not pose an unreasonable
risk of danger for vehicles in the ditch); compare Jackson v. Sewerage & Water Bd., 501
So. 2d 826 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986) (city not liable for damages suffered when plaintiff
stepped into uncovered water meter box unless it had knowledge or constructive knowledge
of the condition created by the missing cover), with Clairmont v. City of New Orleans,
492 So. 2d 1247 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 496 So. 2d 1048 (La. 1986) (city was
liable for injuries sustained when plaintiff stepped into a pothole under strict liability but
not negligence principles); cf. Landry v. State, 495 So. 2d 1284 (La. 1986) (comparative
fault doctrine should be applied to reduce individual's recovery in tort action under La.
Civ. Code art. 2317). In addition, the Louisiana Supreme Court rendered important
decisions holding that a police officer pursuing a suspect was acting within the course
and scope of his employment even though he was outside the corporate limits of the
municipality, Lamkin v. Brooks, 498 So. 2d 1068 (La. 1986), and that the statutory
exemption of she'riffs and their deputies from the worker's compensation law does not
deny deputies equal protection of the law, Parker v. Cappel, 500 So. 2d 771 (La. 1987).
Curiously, in the latter case, the court did not even discuss the more substantial claim
that the denial of worker's compensation benefits violated the abrogation of governmental
immunity in the state constitution. See La. Const. art XII, § 10; Murchison, Developments
in the Law, 1983-1984-Local Government Law, 45 La. L. Rev. 357, 394-95 (1984);
Murchison, Developments in the Law, 1982-1983-Local Government Law, 44 La. L.
Rev. 373, 408-10 (1983).
20. Common Cause v. Morial, 506 So. 2d 167 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987) (even though
tape of meeting was a public record of the mayor's office, neither current mayor nor
current director of public information had a duty to produce it because neither of them
had possession of it and both were unaware of its continued existence); Buras v. State,
496 So. 2d 517 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986) (statute providing that tax records and files of
Department of Revenue and Taxation are confidential allows agency to deny release of
records of notices of delinquency or deficiency regarding vendors at festival as well as
books and reports regarding amount of state sales tax paid at festival); Bizal v. Connick,
489 So. 343 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 491 So. 2d 10 (La. 1986) (records of
criminal cases pending on appeal have not been "finally adjudicated or otherwise settled"
and thus do not have to be released under the Public Records Act).
21. Common Cause v. Morial, 506 So. 2d 167 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987) (meeting
between the mayor and members of the park commission was not a "meeting" within
the meaning of the open meetings law).
22. 1987 La. Acts No. 460, 597, 667, 687; see infra notes 153-63 and accompanying
text. See also 1987 La. Acts No. 466 (protecting clerks of court from liability as individuals
and in their official capacity when they cancel records on the written order of a judge,
sheriff, or bankruptcy referee).
23. 1987 La. Acts No. 648; see infra notes 141-52.
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LAND USE PLANNING

Keystone Bituminous Coal Association
Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis2 4 is important
for its confirmation that state and local governments can establish significant restrictions on the use of property without violating the taking
clause. 2 The Pennsylvania statute under attack in Keystone restricted
coal mining operations in order to prevent subsidence around public
buildings and noncommercial buildings generally used by the public,
dwellings used for human habitation, and cemeteries. 26 The administrative
regulations implementing the statute normally required that mining companies keep fifty percent of the coal beneath structures in place to

24. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987). Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented on the taking issue in
an opinion that Justices Powell, O'Connor, and Scalia joined. Id. at 1253. The Chief
Justice began with the observation that the opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393, 43 S.Ct. 158 (1922), which was distinguished by the majority in Keystone,
was entitled to special respect as a precedent because it was "a cornerstone of the
jurisprudence of the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause." Id. at 1254. He
then proceeded to reject both grounds on which the majority distinguished Pennsylvania
Coal. First, he rejected the argument that the statute under attack in Keystone differed
from the earlier legislation because of the public purposes it was designed to serve.
According to the Chief Justice, the earlier statute was also "intended to serve public
interests" and "the Court made clear that the mere existence of a public purpose was
insufficient to release the government from the compensation requirement .
" I.
Id. at
1255. Nor were the admittedly valid purposes served by the contemporary statute sufficient
to bring it within the "nuisance exception" to the compensation requirement. Not only
were the nuisance regulations allowed in prior cases far narrower in scope than the current
statute, but those earlier decisions had never "allow[ed] complete extinction of the value
of a parcel of property" as was done in Keystone with respect to the interests in particular
coal deposits. Id. at 1257. Second, the Chief Justice argued that the statute upheld in
Keystone denied the coal mining companies all economically viable use of two "identifiable
and separable" property interests: the twenty-seven million tons of coal they were required
to leave in the ground and the support estates that they had purchased to enhance the
value of their mineral interests. In such cases, he regarded the balancing approach employed
in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S. Ct. 2646
(1978), as inappropriate: "Physical appropriation by the government leaves no doubt that
it has in fact deprived the owner of all uses of the land." Id. at 1259.
25. U.S. Const. amend V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation."). The just compensation requirement of the fifth amendment
was one of the first guarantees in the bill of rights to be applied to the states through
the fourteenth amendment. See Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S.
226, 17 S. Ct. 581 (1897).
26. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 52, § 1406.4 (Purdon Supp. 1987). The statute only protects
structures in existence when the statute was passed in 1966. Following passage of the
Federal Surface Mining and Reclamation Act, the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources adopted regulations that protected buildings constructed after 1966 as
well as other classes of buildings and surface features. See 107 S. Ct. at 1237 n.6.
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provide surface support. Notwithstanding these restrictions, the United
States Supreme Court held that neither the statute nor the regulations
constituted a taking for which the Federal Constitution requires the
27
payment of just compensation.
In explaining why the Pennsylvania regulatory scheme did not amount
to a taking, the Keystone opinion focused on two factors: the character
of the governmental action and the magnitude of the economic impact
on the property owners. Moreover, it reemphasized that the burden of
showing the requisite economic impact was particularly onerous when
an owner was challenging a statute on its face rather than in its application to a particular property.
The Pennsylvania statute identified five public purposes that the
subsidence regulations served: protection of public safety, enhancement
of the value of land for taxation, preservation of surface water drainage
and public water supplies, general improvement in the use and enjoyment
of the lands, and maintenance of primary jurisdiction over surface mining
of coal within the state. 2 The lower courts "were both convinced that
the legislative purposes ... were genuine, substantial, and legitimate,"
and the Supreme Court had "no reason to conclude otherwise. ' 29 According to Keystone, Supreme Court opinions had long recognized the
government's "substantial" public interest in "preventing activities similar to public nuisances," and the Pennsylvania statute "plainly seeks
'
to further such an interest." 30
Keystone also concluded that those challenging the Pennsylvania
statute had failed to show a sufficient economic impact to satisfy the
"heavy burden placed upon one alleging a regulatory taking."'" On this
point, the Supreme Court emphasized the "uphill battle" the challengers
faced because they had framed their claim as a facial challenge to the
Act, rather than focusing on its impact on individual landowners. With
respect to the mineral estate in the coal, the challengers failed to meet
the burden because they offered no proof "that the Act makes it
commercially impracticable for them to continue mining their . . . coal
interests . . .. " 32
As is frequently true in regulatory taking claims, the crucial issue
was the definition of the property interest at stake. In Keystone, the

27. In addition to the taking issue discussed in the text, the Court also rejected the
claim that the statute impaired the obligation of contracts in violation of Article I,
§ 10 of the Federal Constitution. See 107 S. Ct. at 1251-53.
28. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 52, § 1406.2 (Purdon Supp. 1987), quoted at 107 S. Ct. at
1242.
29. 107 S. Ct. at 1242 (footnotes omitted).
30. Id. at 1246. The precedents are discussed in id. at 1243-46.
31. Id. at 1246.
32. Id.at 1247-48.
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Supreme Court accepted the mineral estate as the property being regulated, Fejecting arguments that it should focus on the coal left in the
ground or the "support estate" that the coal companies had also obtained
when they purchased the mineral estate. The refusal to characterize the
coal left in the ground as a distinct property interest was not particularly
startling because that coal was not capable of separate ownership apart
from the general mineral estate. 3 However, the refusal to treat the
support estate as an independent property interest was more problematic
because Pennsylvania law recognized the support estate "as a separate
interest in land that can be conveyed apart from either the mineral
estate or the surface estate." In the Supreme Court's view, prior decisions
had established the "right to sell property as just one element of the
owner's property interest," and that one element was not determinative
of whether the Pennsylvania statute had effected a taking. Although
the support estate is theoretically susceptible of separate ownership, "as
a practical matter the support estate is always owned by either the owner
of the surface or the owner of the minerals;" and "in practical terms,"
its value depends on its protection or enhancement of "the value of
the [surface or mineral] estate with which it is associated."3 a4 Thus, "[ilts
value is merely a part of the entire bundle of rights possessed by the
owner of either the coal or the surface,"" and "the destruction of one
'strand' of the bundle is not a taking because the aggregate must be
' 36
viewed in its entirety.
To reach the Keystone result, the Supreme Court had to overrule
3 7
or to distinguish its 1922 decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
which had invalidated an earlier subsidence statute enacted by the Pennsylvania legislature. The Court chose the latter approach and concluded
that Pennsylvania Coal was distinguishable in terms of both the public
purpose it served and the impact on the owners of the mineral estate.
With respect to public purpose, Pennsylvania Coal had found the earlier
statute to be a "'private benefit' statute" designed to protect "against
damage to some private landowners' homes." 3' By contrast, in the statute

33. Id. at 1249; but see id. at 1259 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 1250. The Court also indicated that the Keystone claim would have failed
to satisfy the "heavy burden of sustaining a facial challenge to the Act" even if the
support estate were viewed "as a distinct segment of property for 'takings' purposes. .. "
The claimants owned "the support estate for a great deal of land, only part of which
is protected under the [statute]." Moreover, "[tihe record is devoid of any evidence on
what percentage of the purchased support estates, either in the aggregate or with respect
-to any individual estate, has been affected by the Act." Id. at 1250-51.
35. Id. at 1250.
36. Id. at 1248, quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66, 100 S. Ct. 318, 32627 (1979).
37. 260 U.S. 393, 43 S. Ct. 158 (1922).
38. 107 S. Ct. at 1242-43, quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 414 & 416,
43 S. Ct. at 159-60 (1922).
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under attack in Keystone, "the Commonwealth [was] acting to protect
the public interest in health, the environment, and the fiscal integrity
of the area." 3 9 In addition, Pennsylvania Coal was premised on the coal
company's demonstration "that it could not undertake profitable anthracite coal mining in light of the [earlier statute]." ' 40 By contrast, the
Keystone plaintiffs had "not come close to satisfying their burden of
proving that they have been denied the economically viable use of that
4
property." '

First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County
of Los Angeles4 2 is probably the more significant of the two decisions
granting increased protection for landowners. Finally reaching an issue
it had avoided on procedural grounds at least four times, 43 the Court
confirmed views expressed in the concurring and dissenting opinions of
a majority of the Justices in San Diego Gas and Electric Co. v. City
of San Diego" and held that local governments must pay damages for
"temporary" takings. Moreover, the Court defined a temporary taking
as the period before a court "finally determine[s]" that a challenged

.39. 107 S. Ct. at 1243.
40. Id. at 1249.
41. Id.
42. 107 S. Ct. 2378. Justice Stevens dissented in an opinion that Justices Blackmun
and O'Connor joined in part. Id. at 2389. At the beginning of the dissenting opinion,
Justice Stevens offered the following summary of his objections to the majority opinion:
Four flaws in the Court's analysis merit special comment. First, the Court
unnecessarily and imprudently assumes that appellant's complaint alleges an
unconstitutional taking of Lutherglen. Second, the Court distorts our precedents
in the area of regulatory takings when it concludes that all ordinances which
would constitute takings if allowed to remain in effect permanently, necessarily
also constitute takings if they are in effect for only a limited period of time.
Third, the Court incorrectly assumes that the California Supreme Court has
already decided that it will never allow a state court to grant monetary relief
for a temporary regulatory taking, and then uses that conclusion to reverse a
judgment which is correct under the Court's own theories. Finally, the Court
errs in concluding that it is the Takings Clause, rather than the Due Process
Clause, which is the primary constraint on the use of unfair and dilatory
procedures in the land-use area.
Id. at 2390. Justices Blackmun and O'Connor concurred in the first and third points of
Justice Stevens' opinion.
43. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986);
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S.
Ct. 3108 (1985); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 101
S. Ct. 1287 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 100 S. Ct. 2138 (1980).
44. 450 U.S. 621, 633, 101 S. Ct. 1287, 1294 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); id.
at 636, 101 S. Ct. at 1296 (Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and Powell, J.J., dissenting).
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regulation "constitutes a 'taking' of [the landowner's] property, ' 4 and
it indicated that the appropriate measure of damages was the "fair value
46
for the use of the property" during the temporary taking.
According to First English Evangelical Lutheran Church, previous
decisions had established that a landowner subject to an unconstitutional
regulation has no right to insist that the government pay the fair market
value of the property. The government always has the privilege of
"abandon[ing] its intru sion or discontinu[ing] regulations. '47 Nonetheless, the Court asserted, those decisions had never resolved the issue
now before it: "whether abandonment by the government requires payment of compensation for the period of time during which regulations
'4
deny a landowner all use of [the] land."
In resolving this question, the Court rejected the analogy to cases
where it had denied compensation for a decline in market value that
occurred after the government's decision to begin a project but before
the initiation of formal condemnation proceedings. 49 Instead, it relied
on cases requiring compensation when "the government has only temporarily exercised its right to use private property." 50 These decisions
established, the Court insisted, "that 'temporary' takings . . . are not
different in kind from permanent takings, for which the Constitution
clearly requires compensation." 5 Conceding that its holding would "undoubtedly lessen . . . the . . . flexibility of land-use planners and governing bodies of municipal corporations when enacting land-use
regulations," the majority justified that result as the necessary conse2
quence of any decision upholding a claim of constitutional right.1
The Supreme Court did, however, add one curious qualification to
its opinion. Having noted the extreme character of the nine-year deprivation involved in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church, 3 the
Court expressly limited its holding "to the facts presented" and professed
not to "deal with the quite different questions that would arise in the
case of normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning

45. 107 S. Ct. at 2381.
46. Id. at 2389.
47. Id. at 2387; see also id. at 2389 ("Once a court determines that a taking has
occurred, the government retains the whole range of options already available-amendment
of the regulation, withdrawal of the invalidated regulation, or exercise of eminent domain.").
48. Id. at 2387.
49. Id. at 2388; see Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 100 S. Ct. 2138 (1980);
Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 60 S. Ct. 231 (1939).
50. 107 S. Ct. at 2387. Most of these cases "involved appropriation of private property
by the United States for use during World Wa; II." Id.
51. Id. at 2388.
52. Id.at 2389.
53. See id. at 2381-82, 2388.
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ordinances, variances, and the like which are not before us." '5 4 This
qualification is particularly striking because of the procedural posture
of First English Evangelical Lutheran Church. The case came to the
Supreme Court following the grant of the county's motion to strike the
claim for damages from the church's complaint. As a result, neither
the Supreme Court nor the California state courts had determined that
a taking has occurred, and that issue was still open following the Supreme
Court remand.
Nollan
The third decision, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission," lim-

ited the ability of governmental regulators to impose conditions in the
building permits that property owners must obtain before beginning
construction. More specifically, Nollan held invalid the state's attempt
to condition a permit to build a beach house on the permittee's grant
of an easement allowing the public to use the owner's private beach to

travel between two nearby public beaches.

54. Id. at 2389.
55. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1941). Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens
dissented.
In an opinion that Justice Marshall joined, Justice Brennan gave the following summary
of his disagreements with the majority:
The first problem with [the majority opinion] is that the Court imposes a
standard of precision for the exercise of a State's police power that has been
discredited for the better part of this century. Furthermore, even under the
Court's cramped standard, the permit condition imposed in this case directly
responds to the specific type of burden on access created by [the owner's]
development. Finally, a review of those factors deemed most significant in takings
analysis makes clear that the Commission's action implicates none of the concerns
underlying the Takings Clause. The Court has thus struck down the Commission's
reasonable effort to respond to intensified development along the California
coast, on behalf of landowners who can make no claim that their reasonable
expectations have been disrupted. The Court has, in short, given [the owners]
a windfall at the expense of the public.
Id. at 3151 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
According to Justice Blackmun's brief dissenting opinion,
Traditional takings analysis compels the conclusion that there is no taking
here. The governmental action is a valid exercise of the police power, and, so
far as the record reveals, has a nonexistent economic effect on the value of
[the owners'] property. No investment-backed expectations were diminished.
Id. at 3163 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Justice Steven also submitted a dissenting opinion that Justice Blackmun joined. He
called attention to the significance of First English Evangelical Lutheran Church to the
majority's holding that a taking had occurred. In his view, "[e]ven the wisest lawyers
would have to acknowledge great uncertainty about the scope of this Court's takings
jurisprudence." Now, however, "because of the Court's remarkable ruling in [FirstEnglish
Evangelical Lutheran Church], local governments and officials must pay the price for the
necessarily vague standards in this area of the law." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Nollan's analysis began with the question of whether the state could
require the easement as a direct regulation under the police power. It
quickly concluded that ordering such an easement would have constituted
a taking for which just compensation was required. The easement would
fall within the rule that governmental action resulting in a "permanent
6
physical occupation" always constitutes a taking.
Next, the Court turned to the question of whether the commission
could include the easement as a condition in a land use permit even if
it could not require it as a direct regulation. In analyzing this issue,
Nollan emphasized that to survive a taking challenge, land use regulations
must "substantially advance legitimate state interests. 5 7 Inthe case of
the permits before the Court, these criteria would allow the California
Coastal Commission to deny a building permit or to condition a permit
only if the denial or condition substantially advanced legitimate state
interests."
Applying this test to the specific permit at issue, Nollan "assume[d],
without deciding," the validity of the three state interests asserted by
the commission: "protecting the public's ability to see the beach, assisting
the public in overcoming the 'psychological barrier' to using the beach
created by a developed shorefront, and preventing congestion on the
public beaches." 5 9 Moreover, Nollan also accepted "for purposes of
discussion" the commission's statement of the appropriate test for reviewing conditions in land use permits: The condition must be "reasonably related to the public need or burden that the Nollans' new
house creates or to which it contributes." 6 Under that test, the Nollan
permit was invalid because it was not reasonably related to any of the
state interests advanced by the commission. Without extended discussion,
the Court announced its conclusion. It was "impossible to understand"

56.

Id. at 3145, citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.

419, 102 S. Ct. 3164 (1982), and Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 100 S.
Ct. 383 (1979). According to the Nollan majority, "For purposes of [the Loretto] rule,"
a permanent physical occupation occurred because "individuals are given a permanent
and continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real property may continuously be
traversed, even though no particular individual is permitted to station himself permanently
upon the premises."
57. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260, 100 S. Ct. 2138, 2141 (1980),
quoted at 107 S.Ct. 3146. In a later repetition of the first criterion, the Court italicized
the word "substantial." 107 S. Ct. at 3150.
58. Even if a particular state interest justifies denial of a permit, not all permit
conditions are permissible if the permit is granted. The statute can only impose those
conditions that are also reasonably related to the state interest that would justify denial.
See 107 S. Ct. at 3148.
59. Id.at 3147.
60. Id.at 3148.
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how the Nollan condition advanced any of the three state interests on
6
which the commission relied.
The Significance of the 1987 Decisions
Any appraisal of the significance of the 1987 decisions must distinguish between their impact on formal doctrine and the practical effect
they will have on land use regulations. Although they do raise some
new questions, their doctrinal significance will probably be relatively
modest. By contrast, their practical impact is likely to be very substantial.
Formal Doctrine
For the most part, the 1987 decisions simply confirm doctrine that
the Supreme Court has developed in recent years. Not only did the
decisions reiterate the existing standard for determining when a governmental action constitutes a taking, they also demonstrated the difficulty
in prevailing in a facial challenge to a statute, the Court's refusal to
adopt a narrow definition of property in regulatory taking cases, and
the continuing recognition of broad authority to condition land use
permits. Moreover, the specific holding of First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church was certainly predictable, although one can quarrel
with its conceptual framework.
In deciding whether a governmental action that adversely affects
existing property rights amounts to a taking, the 1987 opinions follow
other recent decisions in focusing on two factors, the character of the
governmental activity and the magnitude of the economic impact on the
property. When the government merely places negative restrictions on
the property's use for particular purposes, the Court finds a taking only
when the economic impact is very great. To use the language of the
recent cases, the restriction must deny the property owner any economically viable use of the property. 62 On the other hand, the Court has
adopted a per se rule when the government's action amounts to a
permanent physical occupation of the property; such actions are always
takings, even if their impact on the property is minimal.63 For governmental actions that fall within these extremes, the more recent decisions
have held that the taking question turns on whether the government has
interfered with the reasonable investment-backed expectations of the

61. Id. at 3149.
62. E.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1248
(1987); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264,
294, 101 S. Ct. 2352, 2369 (1981).
63. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhatten CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435-38, 102 S.
Ct. 3164, 3175-77 (1982).
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property owner. 64 Indeed, Keystone suggests that this last inquiry may
that the first two rules may simply be
be the underlying principle and
6
particular applications of it. 1
The 1987 opinions also confirm a second characteristic of contemporary taking doctrine: the practical restriction of successful taking claims
to individual landowners. Following other recent cases, ' 6 Keystone illustrates the difficulty of prevailing in a facial challenge to a statutory
scheme. A statutory scheme violates the taking clause only if its application constitutes a taking with respect to all property to which it applies,
and that burden is a significant one, especially for a negative restriction
that constitutes a taking only when it denies the owner economically viable
use of the property. By contrast, a challenge to the application of a statute
by an individual property owner requires only a showing that the statute
amounts to a taking with .respect to a particular piece of property, a showing that FirstEnglish Evangelical Lutheran Church and Nollan demonstrate
is far more likely to be feasible.
Still a third aspect of contemporary taking doctrine that Keystone
illustrates is the Court's reluctance to segment property interests in a
single parcel of land. The 1978 decision in Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. City of New York6 7 established that the possibility of segmenting
a particular property interest as a distinct legal interest would not preclude governmental regulation which would deprive the segment of its
economic value. Keystone goes one step further to hold that even the
existence of a distinct legal interest will not preclude extreme governmental restrictions on that interest when the interest is always connected,
''as a practical matter," to some larger property interest. 61 Once that
practical connection was established in Keystone, the Court allowed
severe restrictions on the segmented property interest on the ground that
the restrictions merely denied the owners one strand of the bundle of
69
rights associated with the larger mineral interests.
A fourth matter worthy of note is the relatively broad authority
that local governments retain with respect to placing conditions on land

64. E.g., Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005, 104 S. Ct. 2862, 2874
(1984); Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83, 100 S. Ct. 2035, 2042
(1980); cf. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161, 101 S.
Ct. 446, 451 (1980) (claimant must have more than "a mere unilateral expectation").
65. 107 S. Ct. at 1242.
66. E.g., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 455, 459 (1985);
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 296, 101 S.
Ct. 2352, 2370 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260, 100 S. Ct. 2138,
2141 (1980).
67. 438 U.S. 104, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978).
68. 107 S. Ct. at 1250.
69. Id. at 1248, quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66, 100 S. Ct. 318, 32627 (1979).

1987]

LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW

use permits. Even Nollan concedes that authority in two circumstances
that will arise with some frequency. First, Nollan implicitly allows a
governmental body to impose as a permit condition any restriction that
could be imposed as a direct regulation. 70 Second, Nollan explicitly
"accepted, for purposes of discussion," that restrictions which are "reasonably related to the public need or burden" the permitted use creates
or to which it contributes can be imposed as permit conditions even if
the governing authority could not impose them as direct regulation. 71
From a conceptual standpoint, the most problematic of the decisions
is FirstEnglish EvangelicalLutheran Church, which equates the practical
restraints of an invalid governmental regulation with formal assumption
of legal control by the government. Although the holding was predictable
in light of the various opinions in San Diego Gas and Electric Co., the
Court's approach conflicts not only with the formal distinction between
affirmative use and negative regulation recognized in modern taking
cases7 2 but also with the emphasis on legal, as opposed to practical,
relationships that dominate the other opinions of Chief Justice Rehnquist, 73 the author of the First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
opinion.
Without that equation of legal and practical restraints, the First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church opinion is unpersuasive. If the
regulation involved was unconstitutional, it imposed no legally enforceable burden on the landowner who could violate it with impunity. Thus,
the real question was whether the government or the individual should
bear the burden of uncertainty over the constitutional issues, and the
Court gave no good reason for placing that burden on the government.
Beyond this conceptual uncertainty, the 1987 opinions leave a number
of questions unanswered. In particular, future litigation is likely to arise
with respect to the new damage remedy authorized by First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church as well as the scope of the means-ends
scrutiny mandated by Nollan.
In the case of FirstEnglish EvangelicalLutheran Church, uncertainty
shrouds at least two issues. The Court's future opinions will have to
clarify both the scope of the compensatory duty and the means by
which judgments will be enforced.

70. 107 S. Ct. at 3145-46 (1987).
71. Id.at 3148.
72. Compare, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
102 S. Ct. 3164 (1982) (per se rule for permanent physical occupation), with Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S. Ct. 2646 (1978) (denial
of economically viable use standard for negative restrictions).
73. E.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 102 S. Ct. 752 (1982) (standing); Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 92 S. Ct. 1965 (1972) (state action).
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The language expressly confining First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church to its rather extreme facts 74 raises doubts about the scope of
the duty to compensate property owners for temporary takings. The
opinion cautions that its rationale might not apply to normal delays in
the process of land use regulation," but it is hard to understand why
the rationale would be so limited. According to the Court's opinion,
when a regulation constitutes a taking, the Constitution requires compensation for the period of time the regulation remains in effect. Under
that rationale, the length of time the ordinance is effective seems relevant
only to the amount of compensation, not the duty to compensate.
Perhaps the Court may accept the theory that an overly restrictive
regulation does not deny an individual all economically viable use of the
property unless it remains in effect for an unreasonable length of time, but
such a holding would amount to a significant modification of FirstEnglish
EvangelicalLutheran Church. At any rate, the inclusion of the qualifying
language suggests that some members of the First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church majority may harbor doubts about the wisdom of
subjecting local governments to monetary judgments for every error in
administering a scheme of land use regulations."6
Enforcing monetary judgments in temporary taking cases raises new and
perplexing issues. These cases are more like federal tort cases than traditional
expropriation or inverse condemnation cases in which the government has the
alternative of returning the property to the landowner if the court ordered
compensation is higher than the government believes it can afford.
Because the temporary taking will already have occurred, the government
can not reduce the amount of the judgment by unilateral action. As a
result, the enforcement problems that lurk behind civil rights and other
judgments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 will also arise in temporary taking
cases. States and state agencies (like the California Coastal Commission)
will, of course, face no difficulties because the eleventh amendment 77
forbids judgments against the state without its consent.78 But local

74. For a summary of the delay involved in FirstEnglish EvangelicalLutheran Church,
see 107 S. Ct. at 2381-82, 2388.
75. Id. at 2389.
76. Three members of the First English Evangelical Lutheran Church majorityJustices Brennan, White, and Marshall-joined with Justices Blackmun and Stevens to
form the Keystone majority upholding the Pennsylvania statute regulating coal mining
operations. In addition, Justices Brennan and Marshall joined Justices Blackmun and
Stevens in dissent in Nollan.
77. U.S. Const. amend. XI:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted agairst one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.
78. Papasan v. Allain, 106 S. Ct. 2932 (1986); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984).
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governments (like the County of Los Angeles) enjoy no such immunity, 79
and they may face ruinous judgments. If that occurs, federal judges
will have to decide whether public property can be seized to pay those
judgments80 or whether writs of mandamus can be issued to require
local governments to pay their tort judgments in preference to providing
essential local services."' The potential for federal intrusion into local
affairs is obviously extreme, and thus it is highly ironic that Chief
Justice Rehnquist, the great advocate for states rights in the federal
system,8 2 authored what may prove to be one of the great restrictions
of those rights.
Equally ironic is that First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
may produce a pyrrhic victory in some cases. A judge (even an appointed
federal judge) who knows that finding that a taking has occurred will
obligate the government to pay a large damage award, may be less likely
to find that a taking has occurred. That reluctance is especially likely
to appear in state court where most taking claims are litigated, and

state courts generally have a doctrinal alternative. They can declare a
regulatory statute to constitute an unreasonable exercise of the police
power under state law without holding that it amounts to a taking. 83

79. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S. Ct.
568 (1977).
80. Relying on the state constitution, Louisiana courts have refused to allow the
public property to be seized to pay tort judgments under state law. See Foreman v.
Vermillion Parish Police Jury, 336 So. 2d 986 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 339 So.
2d 846 (La. 1976), discussed in Note: Enforcement of Judgments Against Governmental
Entities: The New Soverign Immunity, 37 La. L. Rev. 982 (1977).
81. Louisiana courts have also ruled that mandamus is unavailable because the appropriation decision is a discretionary, not a ministerial, duty. See De Laureal Engineers,
Inc. v. St. Charles Parish Police Jury, 406 So. 2d 770 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981), writ
denied, 410 So. 2d 758 (La. 1982); Penalber v. Blount, 405 So. 2d 1378 (La. App. 1st
Cir.), writ denied, 407 So. 2d 1189 (La. 1981), analyzed in Murchison, Developments in
the Law, 1981-1982-Local Government Law, 43 La. L. Rev. 461, 488-89 (1982). Of
course, federal courts could rely on the supremacy clause to hold that the federal judgments
had priority over other obligations of local governments.
82. E.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 579,
105 S. Ct. 1005, 1033 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976).
83. Louisiana now has a textual basis for this approach in the state constitution, see
La. Const. art. I. § 4 ("Every person has the right to acquire, own, control, use, enjoy,
protect, and dispose of private property. This right is subject to reasonable statutory
restrictions and the reasonable exercise of the police power."), but Louisiana courts applied
the reasonableness test to land use regulations even before the adoption of the 1974
constitution. E.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. City of New Orleans, 238 La. 936, 117 So.
2d 64 (1960); City of New Orleans, v. Pergament, 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d 129 (1941);
Hi-Lo Oil Co. v. City of Crowley, 274 So. 2d 757 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 277
So. 2d 673 (La. 1973). See generally Murchison, Developments in the Law, 1984-1985Local Government Law, 46 La. L. Rev. 491, 516-17 (1986).
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Only future litigation will demonstrate the extent to which courts will
avail themselves of this alternative.
Nollan's requirement that land use regulations bear a reasonable
relationship to a legitimate state interest is another aspect of the 1987
decisions that will surely invite litigation. The Nollan opinion denies
that it is strengthening the ends-means scrutiny of modern taking cases,
but the Nollan language does reflect a shift from the "rational relationship" phrase of many modern decisions concerning the regulation
of economic and social matters.8 4 In other areas, the shift to "reasonableness" language has heralded greater judicial willingness to overrule
governmental action. 85 If a similar shift occurs in taking cases, Justice
Scalia's majority opinion in Nollan may have started the revival of
economic rights that Chief Justice Rehnquist has advocated for the last
6
decade."
Of course, a reasonableness test will still allow for a considerable
degree of governmental restriction of property interests. Indeed, Nollan
itself emphasizes that more onerous restrictions than are reasonably
related to the burden imposed by the permitted use may be permissible
87
when less restrictive conditions unrelated to that burden are not.
Interestingly, a more onerous permit condition than the one the
California Coastal Commission actually imposed may have been permissible in Nollan itself. In Nollan, the commission made the unsurprising claim that granting the permit would create additional demands
for access to the public beaches in the area. The Nollan opinion described
the process by which this increase in demand would create a "psychological" barrier to use of the public beaches as "not altogether clear," 88
but the reasoning that suggests that building permits would create an
increase in demands on public beaches is straightforward and obvious.
The replacement of an unhabitable bungalow with a three-bedroom house
will likely increase the number of inhabitants of the beachfront property.
Those inhabitants can, and probably will, use nearby public beaches as

84. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3151-54 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia argued that the Court
had never embraced the "rational relationship" approach for taking claims as it had for
due process and equal protection. Id. at 3147 n.3.
85. E.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 97 S.Ct. 1021 (1977) (equal protection
review of gender classifications); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 90 S. Ct.
844 (1970) (review of state regulations under the dormant commerce clause).
86. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1253
(1987) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,
438 U.S. 104, 136, 98 S. Ct. 2646, 2666 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
87. 107 S. Ct. at 3148.
88. Id. at 3149.
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well as their own private beach. The cumulative impact

89

of such in-

creased beach use will increase the need for public beaches.
The Court refused to accept this impact on nearby public beaches
as sufficient to justify the condition in the Nollan permit because that
condition-an easement to move across the private beach when travelling
between public beaches-did nothing to alleviate the burden imposed by
the building permit-increased use of the public beaches. However, the
Nollan test might allow a permit condition that required public access
to use the private beach. The argument for such a condition would run
as follows. Approval of the building permit (together with similar building permits in the area) would impose the burden of increased demand
for use of the public beaches in the area. Thus, allowing public uses
of the private beaches would be reasonably related to the need for
increased beachfront property that the building permit creates. Only time
(and future cases) will tell whether the Supreme Court (as well as lower
federal courts and state courts) will accept such arguments.
PracticalImpact
The practical effect of the 1987 decisions, particularly First English
EvangelicalLutheran Church, on local governments is likely to be much
greater than their theoretical impact on modern taking doctrine. Because
local governments (but not state agencies) face the prospect of monetary
judgments if they enact invalid land use regulations, they may become more reluctant to adopt stringent regulations and opt instead
to negotiate settlements acceptable to developers and other landowners.
The net result will be a decline in governmental control over property
development, a decline that the present Supreme Court majority is
unlikely to mourn.
Nollan's reasonableness test may also prove particularly troublesome for local governments. As indicated above, one could plausibly
argue that the Nollan test would permit an even stricter condition than
the one the Court invalidated. But any local government that elects to
test the limits of the reasonableness test faces the prospect of a substantial
monetary judgment if its prediction of the judicial reaction to a particular
permit condition is inaccurate. Surely one does not need psychic powers
to predict that few local governments will take the risk of exercising
the full extent of their police powers. In stark contrast to the customary
"underenforcement" of constitutional norms, 90 Nollan's test, combined
with the possibility of a monetary judgment, will "overenforce" the

89. Nollan acknowledges that land use regulations can consider the cumulative impact
of numerous similar uses. Id. at 3147.
90. See generally Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212 (1978).
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taking clause by deterring local governments from the reasonable regulations of land use that even the present Supreme Court acknowledges
they have the constitutional power to enact.
EMPLOYEES

OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS:

THE REQUIREMENTS

OF

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

The 1985 decision of the United States Supreme Court in Cleveland
Board of Education v. LoudermilP' clarified the relationship of civil
service laws to the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of procedural due
process 92 in two respects. First, whenever the substantive protections
against discharge in a civil service law constitute a property interest
under state law, the fourteenth amendment, not state law, defines the
minimum procedures that must be followed before an employee may
be discharged. 93 Second, the minimum procedures of the due process
guarantee require that a governmental employer provide an informal
94
hearing to civil services employees prior to discharging them.
In defining the minimum requirements of due process, Loudermill
applied the "fundamental fairness" test of Mathews v. Eldridge.91 As
explained in Loudermill, the Mathews test requires a "balancing" of
three interests: "the private interest in retaining employment, the governmental interest in the expeditious removal of unsatisfactory employees
and the avoidance of administrative burdens, and the risk of an erroneous
termination."9 For civil service employees, that balancing process requires an informal "hearing" prior to discharge. Not only does discharge
have a very substantial impact on the employee, but the hearing requirement imposes only a modest burden on the governmental employer,
and a significant danger of an erroneous decision exists if no hearing
is provided. The court emphasized, however, that the hearing "need not
be elaborate." All the governmental employer is required to do is to
provide "[tihe tenured public employee . . . [with] oral or written notice
of the charges . . ., an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an
opportunity to present his side of the story." 97

91.

470 U.S. 532,

105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985).

92. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1: "No state shall ... deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
93. 470 U.S. 541, 105 S. Ct. at 1493.
94. Id.at 542, 105 S. Ct. at 1494.
95. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976).
96. 470 U.S. at 542-43, 105 S. Ct. at 1494. 97. Id. at 545-46, 105 S. Ct. at 1495.
Cf. Haughton Elevator Div. v. State, 367 So. 2d 1161 (La. 1979) (due process requires
that low bidder on state contract receive notice and a hearing before being disqualified).
97. Id. at 545-46, 105 S. Ct. at 1495. Cf. Haughton Elevator Div. v. State, 367 So.
2d 1161 (La. 1979) (due process requires that low bidder on state contract receive notice
and a hearing before being disqualified).
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Many, probably most, employees of Louisiana local governments
are protected by some civil service law. 98 Although details vary, the
general parameters of all of these laws are similar to the statutes involved
in Loudermill. Substantively, they forbid discharging employees except
for cause, 99 which is generally defined as misconduct impairing the
efficiency of the governmental agency where the individual is employed. 00
Procedurally, they require the appointing authority to provide the employee with written notice of the reasons for discharge, and they offer
the employee a right of appeal to an administrative board. 01 At the
appeal hearing, the appointing authority bears the burden of establishing
grounds for the discharge; 0 2 and either party may appeal the administrative decision to the courts.103 Moreover, both the administrative
agency and the reviewing court can order the reinstatement with back
pay of an individual who has been wrongfully terminated.' °4
The procedural protections of Louisiana's civil service laws do not
include provision for a pre-discharge hearing. However, decisions in two
different courts of appeal' 05 confirm that the due process guarantees of
the federal and state 01 6 constitutions require such a hearing before a
civil service employee may be discharged.

98. The most notable exceptions involve those who work for the various constitutional
officers who serve within local boundaries. See La. Const. art. V, §§ 26 (district attorneys);
27 (sheriffs); 28 (clerks of court); 29 (coroners). Most parish and municipal employees
are covered by civil service systems established at the local level. See, e.g., La. Const.
art. X, § 15 (no state law establishing parochial or municipal civil service system after
effective date of 1974 Constitution is effective until the local governing authority approves
it by ordinance).
99. See, e.g., La. Const. art. X, § 8(A) (civil service for City of New Orleans); La.
R.S. 33:2500 (1966) (civil service for police officers and fire fighters in city with a
population between 13,000 and 250,000). See generally Hetherwick, Municipal Fire and
Police Civil Service Law-R.S. 33:2471 et seq., 29 La. B.J. 304 (1982).
100. See Newman v. Department of Fire, 425 So. 2d 753, 754 (La. 1983); Leggett v.
Northwestern State College, 242 La. 927, 140 So. 2d 5 (1962).
101. See, e.g., La. Const. art. X, § 8(A) (civil service for City of New Orleans); La.
R.S. 33:2501 (Supp. 1987) (civil service for police officers and fire fighters in city with
a population between 13,000 and 250,000).
102. See, e.g., La. Const. art. X, § 8(A); Newman v. Department of Fire, 425 So.
2d 753, 754 (La. 1983); City of Kenner v. Wool, 433 So. 2d 785 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1983).
103. See, e.g., La. Const. art. X, § 12 (civil service for City of New Orleans); La.
R.S. 33:2501(E) (Supp. 1987) (civil service for police officers and fire fighters in city with
a population between 13,000 and 250,000).
104. See, e.g., La. R.S. 33:2501(c) (Supp. 1987); cf. Boozer v. Department of Health
& Human Services, 470 So. 2d 490 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 475 So. 2d 356 (La.
1985) (civil service commission properly ordered back pay reduced by amount of unemployment compensation received prior to reinstatement).
105. Feder v. Pope, 498 So. 2d 270 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986); Brumfield v. Department
of Fire, 488 So. Id 1181 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986).
106. La. Const. art. I, § 2. None of the Louisiana decisions suggests that the protections

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 48

In view of the Supreme Court's decision in Loudermill, the decisions
requiring predischarge hearings for disciplinary dismissals seem entirely
correct. Under Louisiana law, civil service status grants the covered
employee a property right in his or her position. 01 7 Thus, the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause establishes the minimum procedural
requirements that the state must afford to civil service employees, and
Loudermill has already decided that the proper balance of the relevant
interests requires an informal hearing prior to discharge.
Ideally, the various civil service laws should be revised to provide
for an informal hearing before the appointing authority makes the final
discharge decision. Unfortunately, those revisions may not appear immediately, especially for those civil service provisions that are found in
the state constitution rather than the revised statutes.' 08 Until appropriate
revisions are made in the constitutional and statutory provisions, local
governments should implement Loudermill administratively. All that is
needed is an internal rule that requires any appointing authority who
plans to discharge an employee (1) to notify the employee of the planned
discharge and of the evidentiary basis for the action and (2) to allow
the employee to explain his or her version of the incident that lead to
the appointing authority's preliminary decision. If that explanation fails
to convince the appointing authority that discharge is inappropriate, the
appointing authority should proceed to discharge the employee in accordance with the requirements of the relevant civil service law. 0 9
A similar administrative procedure also appears prudent with respect
to lesser disciplinary actions such as suspensions and demotions. Louisiana civil service laws also require "cause" before an appointing authority can initiate these actions," 0 and they allow the employee a right
of appeal."' Thus, state law probably grants the employee a sufficient
property interest to mandate application of Loudermill's "fundamental
fairness" test, and application of that test is likely to mandate an
informal hearing prior to the disciplinary action. Although the impact

of the due process guarantee in the state constitution differ from those of the Federal
Constitution.
107. Bell v. Department of Health & Human Services, 483 So. 2d 945, 949 (La.),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 105 (1986).
108. See La. Const. art. X, §§ 1-15.
109. Apparently, the New Orleans Civil Service Board already adopted such an administrative rule. See Brumfield v. Department of Fire, 488 So. 2d 1181, 1183 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1986) (quoting Rule IX of the New Orleans City Civil Service Rules).
110. See, e.g., La. Const. art. X, § 8(A) (civil service for City of New Orleans); La.
R.S. 33:2500 (1966) (civil service for police officers and fire fighters in city with a
population between 13,000 and 250,000).
111. See, e.g., La. Const. art. X, § 8(A) (civil service for City of New Orleans); La.
R.S. 33:2501 (1987 Supp.) (civil service for police officers and fire fighters in city with
a population between 13,000 and 250,000).
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on the employee in suspensions and demotions is less substantial than
in dismissals, the impact can still be quite substantial. In addition, the
administrative burden of providing an informal hearing and the risk of
erroneous determination if no hearing is held remain the same for lesser
disciplinary actions as for dismissals. In light of the small administrative
burden, both state and federal courts are likely to define notice and an
opportunity to respond before the action is implemented as minimum
requirements of due process.
More problematic is the application of Loudermill to nondisciplinary
actions under the civil service laws. Louisiana's appellate courts have
considered the problem in two contexts: position reallocations and layoffs. In both cases, the courts have concluded that Loudermill's balancing
test applies, but that the provision for a civil service appeal following
implementation of the action satisfies the requirements of due process." 2
Neither opinion gives much attention to the question of whether
reallocations or layoffs deprive an employee of a property interest that
would trigger the requirements of due process. Nonetheless, the holdings
that a property interest exists" 3 appear correct. The civil service laws
define and limit the conditions under which a governmental employer
may reallocate a position to a lower grade or layoff employees,"14 and
they also allow an employee to appeal the actions administratively." 5
Loudermill found these elements adequate to create a property interest
in discharge actions, and they should also be adequate to create a
property interest with respect to reallocations and layoffs.
Even
though the existence of a property interest mandates compliance with
the procedural due process requirements of federal and state constitutions, the Louisiana courts correctly declined to impose Loudermill's
predischarge hearing on reallocation and layoff actions. In both cases,
balancing the relevant interests leads to the conclusion that the postaction
appeals allowed by the civil service laws satisfy the minimum requirements of due process.
Limiting the employee to the postaction appeal is easy to justify in
reallocation actions. First, the impact on the individual is much less

112. Bell v. Department of Health & Human Services, 483 So. 2d 945, 951 (La.),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 105 (1986) (position reallocation under civil service law covering
state employees); New Orleans Ass'n of Firefighters Local 632 v. Civil Service Comm'n,
495 So. 2d 958, 962 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986), writ denied, 499 So. 2d 84 (La. 1987)
(layoffs by New Orleans Civil Service Commission).
113. 483 So. 2d at 951 ("Any benefit from a substitute procedure, requiring preallocation notice and an opportunity to be heard, would be outweighed by the burdens it
would place on the system.").
114. See La. Const. art. X, § 10(A)(3) (rules regarding layoffs); 483 So. 2d at 949
(summarizing provisions of state civil service law relative to position reallocation).
115. 483 So. 2d at 949 (reallocation); Washington v. Department of Utilities, 505 So.
2d 93 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987) (transfer caused by budget reductions).
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substantial than in discharge actions. Not only is the financial impact
far smaller, 1 6 but the position reallocation imposes no stigma on the
individual employee similar to that of a discharge. The basis for the
reallocation is an analysis of the tasks and skills required for the position; 1 7 it is not a reflection of the capabilities of the employee. Second,
the administrative burden remains unchanged from Loudermill, since
both disciplinary and reallocation decisions concern particular individuals. Third, the risk of erroneous determination is less substantial because
the reallocation is preceded by an audit of the position by a personnel
expert. Thus, the reallocation decision is less likely to turn on testimonial
disputes than a discharge decision, and the United States Supreme Court
has been more willing to allow reliance on postaction appeals in such
cases."' Because of the changes with respect to the first and third factors,
limiting the employee to a postaction appeal seems sufficient to satisfy
the minimum requirements of due process.
Reliance on postaction appeals also seems appropriate under the
balancing test in layoff actions. With respect to the first factor, the
immediate financial impact on an employee is substantial because the
employee loses his or her job and the accompanying paycheck. But the
financial burden is not as great as in cases of discharge because the
employee will normally be eligible for unemployment compensation payments, and the employee will also have certain reemployment rights if
new positions become available. Moreover, loss of a job because of an
economic layoff carries much less of a stigma for future employers than
does a discharge for cause. On the other hand, the administrative burden
of reaction hearings is also more substantial in the case of layoffs.
Layoffs generally affect a number of employees and would thus require
numerous hearings, which might delay implementation of the layoffs
and increase the financial difficulties that prompted them in the first
place. Finally, as in reallocation actions, the third factor-the risk of
erroneous determination-also weighs against a preaction hearing. The
basis for layoffs is unlikely to turn on testimonial disputes as to a
particular employee; normally, they are based on revenue projections
that are not well suited to individual hearings.
One final matter relating to the procedural discharge rights of civil
service employees remains unclear: the extent of the financial exposure
that the governmental employer faces. The United States Supreme Court

116.

Frequently, an employee retains the prior pay grade at least for a limited period

of time. See 483 So. 2d at 951; cf. 495 So. 2d at 961 (demotion in connection with
layoff).
117. 483 So. 2d at 950.
118. E.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976) (postdeprivation

hearing adequate for termination of social security disability payments that are based
primarily on medical records rather than testimony).
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has ruled that denials of procedural due process give rise only to nominal
damages unless the individual can show an actual economic loss. 119 Thus,
a governmental employer may be able to avoid financial liability for
the failure to grant a predischarge hearing by showing that the employee
would have been discharged even if a hearing had been provided. However, that argument may be rejected on two grounds. A court may
require the employer to prove that the hearing would not have made
a difference in the decision, and that burden may be difficult to establish.120 Alternatively, a court may hold that no valid termination
occurred until the hearing was provided. To avoid these possibilities,
local governments should provide preaction hearings for all disciplinary
proceedings.
TORT LIABILITY

Landowner Immunity
In six different opinions during 1986-87, Louisiana's appellate courts
considered the applicability of the Louisiana statutes 121 immunizing landowners from tort liability when they allow others to use their property
for noncommercial, recreational purposes. In general, these cases continued the trend toward narrow construction reflected in the earlier
decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court, but two of them confirmed
that the immunity statutes may still prove valuable to governmental
defendants on occasion.
The Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Landry v. Board of
Levee Commissioners22 limited the protection of the immunity statutes
to land that is rural or semi-rural in character, and recent decisions
confirm the continuing validity of this requirement. Thus, in Ratcliff
v. Town of Mandeville121 the supreme court relied on Landry to hold
the immunity statutes inapplicable to a boat dock located within the
boundaries of an incorporated municipality. According to Ratcliff, the

119. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S. Ct. 1042 (1978).
120. The individual cases under review in Loudermill illustrate why the burden might
be difficult to sustain in some situations. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470
U.S. 532, 535-37, 544, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1490-91, 1495.
121. La. R.S. 9:2791, 2795 (1965 & Supp. 1986). For a detailed description of the
statutes, see Murchison, Developments in the Law, 1985-1986- Local Government Law,
47 La. L. Rev. 305, 323-26 (1986).
122. 477 So. 2d 672 (La. 1985). An earlier decision had also required that "the injurycausing condition or instrumentality" be a "type normally encountered in the true outdoors." Keelen v. State Dep't of Culture, Recreation and Tourism, 463 So. 2d 1287,
1290 (La. 1985). The Landry and Keelen decisions are analyzed in Murchison, supra note
121, at 327-32.
123. 502 So. 2d 566 (La. 1987).
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town was not entitled to immunity because the boat dock, like the levee
involved in Landry, was located "within a populated city, adjacent to
a frequently travelled Lakeshore Drive and within a stone's throw of a
residential area. 1' 24 Similarly, the fifth circuit in Herbert v. City of
Kenner121 refused to apply the statute to a playground owned by the
city because the court took "judicial notice of the location of . . . [the
playground] at 600 29th Street" within the city. 126
Other decisions in the courts of appeal also strictly construed the
statute. An opinion of the third circuit 27 emphasized that the governmental owner of recreational property has the burden of proving the
applicability of the immunity statutes. The court of appeals ruled that
without evidence of the character of the property, the trial court's grant
of summary judgment for the governmental landowner had to be reversed
and the case remanded for trial. In addition, a decision of the fifth
circuit' 28 held that the immunity statutes applied only to liability related
to the defendant's status as landowner. They did not protect a levee
board from liability with respect to allegations of negligence arising "out
of the failure of the Levee Board to properly supervise and police
activities which it knew or should have known would be dangerously
' 29
conducted upon the levee.'
Notwithstanding these narrow decisions, two decisions from the first
circuit 30 suggest that the immunity statutes may nonetheless protect local
governments from tort liability in some situations. In both cases, the
court of appeals relied on the immunity statutes as the basis for denying
governmental liability to an individual who was injured in a lake located
in a public park. These decisions may not, however, constitute the final
word on the immunity statutes because the Louisiana Supreme Court
has granted writs to review one of the cases.
To find the statutes applicable, the first circuit decided a number
of issues in favor of the defendant city. First, following decisions of

124. Id. at 567.
125. 501 So. 2d 901 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1987). Herbertdid, however, reject the plaintiff's
claim on the merits. It ruled "[a]s a matter of law," that "the presence of a mound of
mud used to service a baseball diamond on a playground does not create an unreasonable
risk of harm sufficient to impose a duty on the City of Kenner to police the area." Id.
at 906.
126. Id. at 904.
127. Holder v. Louisiana Parks Service, Inc., 493 So. 2d 275 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
128. Cooper v. Brownlow, 491 So. 2d 693 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986).
129. Id. at 695. But see Keelen v. State Dep't of Culture, Recreation and Tourism,
454 So. 2d 147, 150 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 463 So. 2d 1287
(La. 1985) (state not liable for negligence of lifeguards at state park).
130. Stuart v. City of Morgan City, 504 So. 2d 934 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987); Van
Pelt v. Morgan City Power Boat Ass'n, 489 So. 2d 1346 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986), writ
granted, 493 So. 2d 627 (La. 1986).
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the third and fifth circuits,"' the court of appeal held that the immunity
32
statutes covered public entities as well as private property owners.
Second, the appellate court held the statutes applicable even though the
places where the accidents occurred were located near Morgan City.
Despite this proximity to the city, the "natural, 18-square-mile lake"
where both accidents occurred remained "the type of rural or semi-rural
area envisioned by the statute[s]." " Third, the court ruled that the
immunity applied to strict liability claims under Louisiana Civil Code
article 2317 as well as negligence based on article 2315.114 Fourth, the
court narrowly construed the statutory exceptions denying immunity in
cases where the landowner was guilty of "willful or malicious failure
to warn against a dangerous condition."'' According to the first circuit,
the duty under the statute was never greater than the duty in the
traditional tort action. Since the traditional tort duty does not include
the duty to warn of obvious dangers, neither does the landowner's duty
under the statute.' 3 Fifth, the court of appeal rejected claims that the
immunity statutes violated the state constitution's abrogation of governmental immunity'17 and denied injured parties equal protection of the
38
law.
The ultimate fate of the first circuit decisions remains uncertain.
Although the Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs in one of the
cases in September 1986,1 39 that court has not yet rendered an opinion
in the case. In light of the strict construction of the statutes in the
prior supreme court opinions, the prospects for success on all five of
the issues on which the city has to prevail do not appear bright. Moreover, as noted in last year's symposium, 14 the practical limits that the
immunity statutes set to the tort liability of local governments will remain
small even if the Louisiana Supreme Court affirms the decisions of the
first circuit.

131. Rodrigue v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 449 So. 2d 1042 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984);
LaCroix v. State, 477 So. 2d 1246 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 478 So. 2d 1237 (La.
1985); Thomas v. Jeane, 411 So. 2d 744 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982); Pratt v. State, 408
So. 2d 336 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981), writ denied, 412 So. 2d 1098 (La. 1982).
132. 504 So. 2d at 940, 489 So. 2d at 1349. But see Keelen v. State, 482 So. 2d 618
(La. 1986) (Dennis, J., concurring), discussed in Murchison, supra note 121, at 330.
133. 489 So. 2d at 1353; accord 504 So. 2d at 940.
134. 504 So. 2d at 939.
135. La. R.S. 9:2795(B) (Supp. 1987); see also La. R.S. 9:2791(B) (1965).
136. 504 So. 2d at 937-38; 489 So. 2d at 1349-51.
137. 489 So. 2d at 1349. See generally Murchison, supra note 121, at 330; Murchison,
supra note 83, at 519-20.
138. 504 So. 2d at 940-41; see Murchison, supra note .121, at 330, Murchison, supra
note 83, at 517-19.
139. 493 So. 2d 627 (La. 1986).
140. Murchison, supra note 121, at 331-32.
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Liability for Failure to Enforce Building Codes
Act No. 648 of the 1987 legislative session apparently overrules
Stewart v. Schmieder,14 1 which held the city of Baton Rouge liable for
negligent failure to enforce the provisions of its building code. In addition
to granting local governments express authority to enact building codes
that are stricter than state law, 142 the Act tries to limit the potential for
local liability under these codes in three ways. First, the statute identifies
the purpose of building code enforcement as the "reasonable protection
43
of the safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the public."'
Second, it declares that building codes do not impose upon the responsible local government any "duty, special or otherwise, to or for
the benefit of any individual person or group of persons.' 4 Third, it
declares that "any enforcement procedure" '45 is a "discretionary act and
shall be subject to the provisions of R.S. 9:2798.1,"1146 which immunizes
both local governments and their officers and employees from liability
for "policy-making or discretionary acts when such acts are within the
' 47
course and scope of their lawful powers and duties.'
For most situations, the language of the new statute appears broad
enough to preclude liability based on the enforcement of local building
codes. Stewart's premise was the mandatory duty that the Baton Rouge
building code imposed on the building official to review building plans
for compliance with the code's requirements. 48 By negating the duty
and defining enforcement as discretionary, the new statute effectively
removes the linchpin of Stewart's theory of liability, although the prudent
local government will still take care to delete from its building code all
language imposing mandatory duties on its building officials.
An equal protection challenge to Act 648 should have little chance
of success. Because the statutory classification is not one of those

141. 386 So. 2d 1351 (La. 1980), analyzed in Murchison, Developments in the Law,
1980-1981-Local Government Law, 42 La. L. Rev. 564, 592-95 (1982).
142. La. R.S. 33:4773(A), as added by 1987 La. Acts No. 648.
143. La. R.S. 33:4772(2). See also id. § 4772(1): "The policy, purpose, and intent for
the promulgation and adoption of a building code by a political subdivision is to promote
the safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the community."
144. Id. § 4772(3).
145. An "enforcement procedure" is "any act, action, or failure to take aciion by a
public servant or enforcement agency in connection with the implementation of any
provision of a building code, including but not limited to the examination or review of
any plan, drawing, or specifications, the conducting or completion of any inspection, the
issuance, denial, or revocation of any permit, permission, license, or certificate, and the
granting of any approval of construction." Id. § 4771(5).
146. Id. § 4773(D).
147. La. R.S. 9:2798.1 (Supp. 1987), analyzed in Murchison, supra note 83, at 52628.
148. 386 So. 2d at 1355.
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specifically listed in the state constitution,' 4 9 a challenger to the statute
would have to demonstrate that the classification scheme did not further
any appropriate state interest. 50 By encouraging local governments to.
6nforce their building codes without fear of tort liability, the statute
should satisfy that deferential standard.
On the other hand, a challenge based on the state constitution's
abrogation of governmental immunity would have greater possibility of
success. By giving governmental bodies a new defense to tort liability,
the statute would certainly raise the constitutional issue.' 5 ' However, as
a prior symposium discussion has suggested, 52 the Louisiana Supreme
Court may limit the scope of the constitutional provision by holding it
inapplicable to uniquely governmental activities. Because no private entity
exercises regulatory authority like that found in a building code, acceptance of that limiting construction would validate Act 648.
Of course, the new statute does not completely eliminate the potential
for tort liability arising out of building code violations. Faced with an
appealing plaintiff as was the case in Stewart, the courts might well
locate a duty that gives rise to tort liability in regulations outside the
building code or in the customary performance of certain responsibilities.
To minimize these possibilities, local governments should review all
ordinances that affect the construction or operation of buildings, and
they should adopt operating procedures to communicate the limited
nature of building code enforcement to all those who have dealings with
building officials.
Statutory Limits on Individual Liability
During the 1987 regular session, the legislature also enacted a series
of statutes granting tort immunity to certain individuals who serve local
governments. Three of the statutes use nearly identical language to
protect directors, trustees, and members of boards, commissions, and
authorities of political subdivisions; 5 1 officers and board members of

149. See La. Const. art. 1, § 3:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No law shall
discriminate against a person because of race or religious ideas, beliefs, or
affiliations. No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate
against a person because of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or
political ideas or affiliations.
150. See generally Sibley v. Board of Supervisors, 477 So. 2d 1094 (La. 1985), noted
in Comment, Limiting Strict Liability of Governmental Defendants: The Notice Requirement of the 1985 Legislation, 46 La. L. Rev. 1197, 1204 (1986); Murchison, supra note
83, at 517-19.
151. See Jones v. City of Baton Rouge, 388 So. 2d 737 (La. 1980); Segura v. Louisiana
Architects Selection Bd., 362 So. 2d 498 (La. 1978).
152. Murchison, supra note 83, at 520.
153. 1987 La. Acts No. 667.
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voluntary councils on aging; 54 and board members of downtown development districts.' 55 They immunize the covered individuals from personal liability for acts or omissions "arising out of the exercise of [their]
judgment in the formation and implementation of policy while acting
as . . .members[s]" of the covered bodies, but each adds an important
proviso. The immunity applies if the individual "was acting in good
faith and within the scope of his official functions and duties, unless
1 56
the damage or injury was caused by his willful or wanton misconduct. 1
The wording of a fourth statute, which protects volunteer fire fighters, differs slightly. 5 7 It protects the fire fighters from individual liability
for civil damages as a result of acts or omissions in rendering "emergency
or rescue services." The only exception to the immunity granted by the
statute is the exclusion of acts or omissions "intentionally designed to
harm or those grossly negligent acts or omissions that result in harm
to person or property."
The legislative desire to protect those who serve local governments,
especially volunteers, from personal liability is understandable. The elimination of governmental liability gives the injured party a solvent defendant in most cases, but Louisiana's appellate courts have not made much
progress in developing judicial doctrines that limit the individual liability
of public servants.'58
Unfortunately, the 1987 statutes provide an inadequate solution to
the problem that led to their passage. The inartful drafting of the new
statutes gives rise to uncertainty regarding what activities and what type
of actions are covered by the immunity grants.
Particularly ambiguous is the language of the exceptions to the
immunity granted by the statutes protecting members of local government
boards, commissions, authorities, councils, and districts. Each of the
statutes uses three different terms to limit the availability of immunity.5 9

154. 1987 La. Acts No. 597. Act 597 goes beyond the general protections of Act 667
by extending its immunity to "officers" of councils on aging as well as to board members.
155. 1987 La. Acts No. 460. The downtown development districts are also expressly
included in the more general coverage of Act 667. See La. R.S. 9:2792(A), as added by
1987 La. Acts No. 667.
156. La. R.S. 9:2792.2(A), as added by 1987 La. Acts No. 460; La. R.S. 9:2792.2(A),
as added by 1987 La. Acts No. 667; La. R.S. 46:1602(H), as added by 1987 La. Acts
No. 597. Acts 460 and 667 amend the same section of the revised statutes, an oversight
that the Louisiana Law Institute has statutory authority to correct. La. R.S. 24:253 (1975).
157. 1987 La. Acts No. 687. The statutory protection covers "any person who is a
member of an organized volunteer fire department and who acts according to his duties
as a fire fighter."
158. See Murchison, supra note 83, at 527 n.189 and accompanying text.
159. La. R.S. 9:2792.2(A), as added by 1987 La. Acts No. 460; La. R.S. 9:2792.2(B),
as added by 1987 La. Acts No. 667; La. R.S. 46:1602(H), as added by 1987 La. Acts
No. 597.

1987]

LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW

First, the individual must act "in good faith," but none of the statutes
defines or explains what constitutes good faith. Good faith usually
connotes a subjective state of mind; however, federal law has given it
an objective, or reasonableness, component in determining the scope of
individual immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 60 Second, the immunity
statutes do not apply when the individual is guilty of "willful ...
misconduct." Like good faith, willfulness ordinarily implies a subjective
standard that looks to the intent of the individual. By contrast, the
third requirement-that the damages must not be the product of the
defendant's "wanton misconduct"-is more -susceptible to an objective
standard, but that objective standard may require a greater showing of
misconduct than would be required if good faith were given an objective,
reasonableness element as under federal law. About all that one can
predict with confidence is that confusion will abound until the Louisiana
Supreme Court defines the three terms and decides which is controlling.
The language of the statute protecting volunteer fire fighters is only
slightly less ambiguous. It does content itself with two limits to immunity:
''acts or omissions .. .intentionally designed to harm or those grossly
negligent acts or omissions that result in harm to person or property."
On the other hand, the volunteer fire fighter is entitled to the protections
only when acting "according to his duties as a fire fighter."' 61
In addition, all four statutes are also ambiguous as to what types
of actions are protected by the immunity they grant. The first three
limit their protection to officers, directors, trustees, and board members
and to the exercise of "judgment." That language suggests that the
immunity provides a "discretionary acts" exception to individual liability,
but Louisiana law already recognizes such an exception for both governmental entities and public employees.162 Moreover, the new statutes
extend their protection to actions relating to both "formation and implementation of policy," a phrase broad enough to cover virtually any
action that a covered individual might take. Similarly, the statutory
protection for volunteer fire fighters covers them only when they are
"render[ing] emergency or rescue services." The statute is silent as to
whether ordinary fire fighting activities amount to the rendering of
emergency services.
As has been true with previous attempts to limit the tort liability
of local governments and their public servants,163 the principal defect
of the new statutes is their piecemeal approach to the problem. What

160. See, e.g., Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 104 S.Ct. 3012 (1984); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982).
161. La. R.S. 37:1735, as added by 1987 La. Acts No. 687.
162. See La. R.S. 9:2798.1 (Supp. 1987).
163. The author has noted this
need periodically in symposium articles.
See Murchison,
supra note 83, at 532-33; Murchison, supra note 81, at 464-68.
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Louisiana needs-and has needed since the abrogation of governmental
immunity in the constitution of 1974-is a comprehensive statute defining
the liability of local governments and public servants and providing an
effective means for enforcing judgments that are awarded. The continued
reliance on a piecemeal approach will likely exacerbate the confusion
with no real benefit to the public, potential defendants, or injured parties.

